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How Banks Worked (and Sometimes Did Not Work) in the Early Republic
Trying to understand the workings of American banking and finance before
the Civil War can be baffling. There was no central bank and no national
currency, but rather a mostly decentralized system of banks of varying sorts that
circulated thousands of different paper banknotes throughout the country.
Counterfeiting was widespread, banknote values fluctuated wildly and varied
from place to place, and chains of credit and debt created through promissory
notes and bills of exchange easily became byzantine. Fundamental instability
was endemic to the economy, and only the exigencies of the war itself led
policymakers to craft an economic order that began to resemble that of the
modern world.
Anyone who has ever tried to convey the complexity of these circumstances
in a survey lecture knows the looks of befuddlement and boredom on the faces of
undergraduates, and when pressed more than a few historians would surely admit
that they do not entirely understand how the economy worked in the early
republic either. But banking and finance were crucial to the development of the
United States, and they shaped the lives, fortunes, and politics of millions of
people, which makes Sharon Murphy’s Other People’s Money a very welcome
contribution. Part of a series from Johns Hopkins University Press designed to
explain “how things worked” in American history, Other People’s Money traces
the evolution of the American financial system in a fairly clear and
straightforward manner from the age of the American Revolution through the
aftermath of the Civil War. In so doing, it provides a historical and mechanical
primer that experts in the field may not need but that anyone ranging from
undergraduates to scholars with limited economic literacy will find invaluable.
1
Rothman: Other People's Money: How Banking Worked In The Early American Re
Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2017
Befitting a work designed to explain the basics, Murphy begins in the era of
European exploration, laying out elemental components of a barter economy, the
emergence of merchants and of money as a stable store of value, the significance
of specie and of fiat currency, and the mechanics of inflation and deflation. A
quick tour of the financing of the Revolutionary War, the economic chaos that
followed it and that helped create the need for the Constitution, and the financial
plans of Alexander Hamilton leads directly into a discussion of early banks.
For all that the Constitution helped provide some economic authority to a
central government that could act on behalf of the entire nation, Murphy
observes that federalism and constitutional ambiguity set the stage for financial
bedlam in the early republic. Under the Constitution, the federal government
could issue specie but had no explicit power to charter a bank, while states could
charter corporations but had no power to issue money of any kind. In the event,
Congress used the elastic clause of the Constitution to charter a National Bank
that held federal funds, states issued charters for banks that printed money, and
within the space of two generations Americans had created a sprawling
patchwork system of banks and currency. On one hand, that system expanded the
money supply, facilitated all sorts of economic transactions, and enabled the
financing of internal improvements and western expansion. On the other hand,
frauds and failures were not uncommon, it was challenging and sometimes
impossible to sort good money from bad, and both the outsized influence and the
very idea of a national bank were controversial.
Financial panics hardly instilled public confidence in banks. Even as
Murphy delineates the various structural and global factors that contributed to
contractive meltdowns such as the Panic of 1819, she acknowledges that the
difficulties of knowing whether bank loans were sound or speculative, bankers
honest or corrupt, and investments safe or insecure yielded an environment
where distrust was easy to come by and predictability hard to find, making
panics in some measure “a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p. 78). Following the
disaster of 1819, some states instituted reforms designed to prevent the
recurrence of such events, and the Second National Bank under the directorship
of Nicholas Biddle did institute something resembling real regulatory control of
the banking system. But many Americans remained deeply skeptical of banks
regardless. Those skeptics found a champion in President Andrew Jackson, who
achieved his personal mission of destroying the Second National Bank at the
expense of the stability that institution provided.
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The result was the Panic of 1837, and the banking system became more
disorganized in its wake than it had ever been before. No one would deny the
significance of the demise of the Second National Bank, but Murphy makes a
strong case that we have underrated that significance and that it was central to
the history of nineteenth-century America. In its absence, the national economy
entered a multiyear freefall followed by stagnation that only truly lifted with the
California gold rush. Moreover, the panic served as a turning point for
experimentation in the banking system. Some states were so scarred by the panic
that they simply banned banking altogether, but most looked for new banking
models that could make claims to providing stability. This was the age of
so-called free banking, which in an antimonopoly spirit allowed for general
incorporation of banks (and for occasional outright frauds known as “wildcat
banks”). Some places saw the proliferation of savings banks that offered
financial services to members of the working class, or of building and loan banks
that worked especially for members of the middle class. It was in this era as well
that investment banks started coming into play to facilitate sales of stocks and
bonds for states and corporations alike. On the whole, even as there was
significantly greater disarray in the banking and financial system after 1837,
processes of diversification, sophistication, and modernization took place that
paralleled and advanced those trends in the economy more broadly, and that
pointed toward the financial expansion of the post-Civil War era.
Importantly, however, the post-1837 era was not an era of unregulated
banking. Simultaneous to the spread of trends like free banking were more
stringent government regulations of banks put in place to try and avoid yet
another bust. Some states crafted strictly controlled public-private hybrid
systems of banks. Others saw the institution of safety funds, bank inspections,
banking commissions, higher reserve requirements, and check clearinghouses.
The federal government turned to a variant of Martin Van Buren’s Independent
Treasury system that created subtreasuries throughout the country to hold federal
money and that created deflationary pressures that somewhat contained unwise
speculation. Business cycles could not be controlled altogether, but instituted
reforms helped stave off total systemic collapse when the next downturn came in
1857.
Ultimately, it was the Civil War itself that truly transformed the American
financial system. In the Confederacy, the course of the war and policy choices by
Confederate officials proved disastrous for the banking system specifically and
for the economy more generally. The Union, meanwhile, drew on some of the
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experiments of the antebellum era, but both bankers such as Jay Cooke and
Treasury officials such as Salmon Chase made clear that extensive reform would
be needed to sustain the bonds and greenbacks issued to fund the war effort. By
the end of the war, the United States would have a uniform currency, state
banknotes were set down a course toward disappearance, and a system of
federally chartered and federally regulated banks came to exercise outsized sway
over the national economy, though the United States would not have a true
central bank until the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913.
One critique of Other People’s Money might be that the narrative centers
overwhelmingly on politics and the law at the expense of explaining the impact
of the changing financial and banking system on American culture and
especially on the lives of individual Americans. Thousands thrilled to eras of
expansion, fretted that banks were little more than scams and gambling
operations, suffered when economic bubbles burst, and raged for policymakers
to exact revenge against the moneymen on their behalf. More of their voices
would have enlivened a book that can sometimes be dry even as it is deeply
informative. In addition, some greater attention to the significance of slavery in
the development of the banking system would have been welcome. The subject
is hardly absent, but it could have been integrated more thoroughly, particularly
in light of the growing historiography on slavery’s relationship to capitalism.
Nonetheless, Murphy has provided what should be the go-to source for
anyone looking to understand the differences among savings banks, investment
banks, and commercial banks in pre-Civil War America; to know what it meant
for banks to provide discounts on commercial paper; and to know what terms
like fractional reserve, independent treasury, bimetallism, shinplasters, wildcat
banks, and bills of exchange meant. Oh, and if you are wondering how exactly
Andrew Jackson ended up on the twenty-dollar bill, Murphy answers that too.
Read the epilogue.
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